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I. Introduction 
In  the last five years, there have been many 
changes in the institutional arrangements 
of  monetary control. Understanding these 
arrangements is an important factor in gaug- 
ing the short-term effects of  monetary policy. 
Partic~pants  in the money market monitor 
information about short-run changes in the 
tools of monetary policy, because correctly pre- 
dicting Federal Reserve behavior is a major 
factor in correctly predicting changes in the 
cost of very short-term funds. People outside 
the money market monitor such information i% . 
an attempt to predict shifts in the longer-run 
stance of monetary policy.  4 
This Economic Review article describes the 
changes that have taken place both in the 
process generating the federal funds rate and 
in the procedures used by  the Federal Reserve 
to guide policy on a dayxo-day basis. The 
authors show how institutional changesaffect 
the market for bank reserves and explain how 
Geekly money stock announcements have 
been used by reserve market participants to 
predict future events in the reserve market. 
*The  authors conclde  that the two most 
fecent changes by the Federal Reserve-the 
swii~b  t0.a bbrrowed reserve operating pro- 
cedure in October 1982, and the$witch  to 
contemporaneous reserve accounting rules 
in February 1984-have led to reductions in 
the information about the reserve market 
that one can extract from money stock 
announcements. 
The money stock announcements have 
become relatively unimportant for predicting 
events in the contemporaneous reserve mar- 
ket, both because the  Federal Reserve is  target- 
ing borrowed reserves, which tends to  smooth 
interest rates on a weekly or biweekly basis, 
and because much of  the reserve-market infor- 
mation previously associated with the money 
stock announcement is now outdated. Under 
the new contemporaneous reserve require- 
ments, the reserve market clears before the 
M1 data are released. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/1.  Sce  Tinslcy. von 
zur hluehlcn, and 
Fries (1982): .%lcCol- 
lum and Hoehn 
(1983);  and Walsh 
(1982) for the deri- 
cation ofanalytical 
exbressions show- 
ing the unplanned 
change in thefederal 
funds rate expected 
under dgferent oper. 
a fingprocedures  and 
di  fferen t reserve 
accounting regimes. 
2.  See  Niehans . 
(1978),  Chapter 9, 
fora  theoretical anal- 
ysis of the demand 
for bank reserves. 
The term bank  is 
used to include all 
depository insti- 
tuiions.  ' 
3.  &e  Friedman 
and Roberts (1983) 
for a discussion of 
the cartyover provi- 
sion. This clear and 
concise discussion 
explains why excess 
reserves might appear 
to be  perfectly inelas- 
tic with respect to 
interest rates. 
11. The Reserve Market 
In this paper, we are concerned with the use of 
the information in the M1  announcement for 
predicting events in the reserve market. To 
keep the analysis simple, we use a partial 
equilibrium model of  the reserve market. 
Contemporaneous activity in other markets 
is important for the reserve market, but the 
importance lies mainly in the future. The 
inability of  the banking system to arbitrage 
reserves intertemporally (between reserve set- 
tlement periods) tends to isolate the reserve 
market so th%t the federal funds rate depends 
mainly on current or past money growth and 
on the supply of  reserves provided by the 
Federal Reserve in any given reserve settle- 
men  t period. 
The  federal funds rate is the interest'rate in 
the market forinter-bank  reserve loans". The  ' 
demand for reserves is a function of  banks' 
* 
demand for funds to meet legal reserve require- 
ments and demand for clearing balances. The 
supply of  bank reserve;  comes from the Fed.. 
era1 Reserve, either through open:market 
 pera at ions or lending throbg6 the discount 
window. 
Throughout this paper,-we assume that 
market forces operate'to  keep the federal 
funds rate equal to the rate that is expected 
on the final day of  the reserve settlement 
period. Any change in the rate is the result of 
a change in expectations about reserve supply 
or  reserve demand for the current reserve 
settlement period. 
In order to explain the reaction of  the fed- 
eral funds rate to the money stock announce- 
ment. we have to look at three factors: the 
reserve accounting rules underlying demand 
for reserves, the operating procedures under- 
lying supply of  reserves, and the timing of 
the release of  aggregate information about 
demand and supply.'  (See appendix for detailed 
description of  the change in reserve account- 
ing rules.) 
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The demand for reserves is largely determined 
by  the level of  bank deposits and by the struc- 
ture of  reserve requirements against bank 
deposits. In the absence of  reserve require- 
ments, banks would still need reserves as 
clearing balances to hedge against the uncer- 
tainty associated with fluctuations  in deposit 
and loan activityP However, reserve ratios 
have been high enough in the past sb  that 
required reserves have been greater than re- 
serves demanded for clearing purposes. As 
result, the market has been able to reduce 
excess reserves to very low levels. The use 
of  the carryover provision and active trading 
in federal funds has also helped reduce excess 
reserves associated with uncertain reserve 
flows on the last day of the reserve settle- 
ment peri~d.~ 
Required reserves wire  calculated against 
deposit levels of  two weeks 'earlier during the 
period of  lagged reserve requirements (LRR) 
from September 1968 to Fetruary  1984. Thus. 
under LRR, the demand schedule was very 
inelastic with respect to  interest rates, because 
reserves were  calculated against predetermined 
levels of  deposits. Changes in interest rates 
could not affect the past deposit levels. This 
inelasticity is illust~ated  by the steepness 
of  the demand curves in figure 1. Under the 
current form of  contempbraneous reserve 
requirements (CRR), required reserves are 
predetermined on the last two days of  the re- 
serve settlement period. Therefore, we have 
not made a distinction between LRR and CRR 
in figure 1. 
Reserve Supply 
The  shape and location of  the reserve sup- 
ply schedule are determined by the Federal 
Reserve's operating targets and procedures. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/In the planning stage, this policy can be char- 
acterized by  the intended growth rate for M1 
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over a suitable time horizon. For this study, 
we consider that horizon to be the two- or 
three-month interval for which the Federal 
Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
set short-run paths for MI. 
The same planned growth rate for M1 can 
be achieved using very different operating 
procedures. The  operating procedure can be 
defined by an instrument and a feedback rule. 
The Federal Reserve's instruments include 
the discount rate and one of  the following: the 
fedfral funds rate, the level of  nonborrowed 
reserves, or the level of  borrowed reserves. In 
general, we define the instrument as the var- 
iable that is chosen by the FOMC and main- 
tained by the Fedeial Reserve staff at the 
"same level until new instructions are received 
from the FOMC. Feedback is defined as the 
discretionary adjustments to the instrument 
made by the FOMC. 
The  form of  the operating procedure is 
important because some operating procedures  * 
may be  more effective than others in achiev- 
ing a smaller discrepancy between planned 
and actual M1  growth. Since the monetary 
targets are merely intermediate targets, one 
cannot necessarily conclude that the optimal 
operating procedure is the one that gives the 
smallest discrepancy between planned and 
actual M1  growth in the short run. 
Feedbackcan beused with any  of  theinstru- 
ments to control M1 over a longer horizon. 
The major reason the operating procedure is 
important is that the form of  the procedure 
(including the  administrative procedures ilsed 
at the discount window) determines the slope 
of  the short-run reserve supply curve. This 
slope, in turn, determines whether shocks to 
the reserve market are absorbed by changes 
in interest. rates or by changes in reserves. 
A relatively el-ic  (flat) supply curve implies 
that  shocks will be met by changes in thequan- 
tity of  reserves. A relatively inelastic (steep)  - 
supply curve implies that shocks will be  met 
by changes in the interest rate. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/4. Our period of 
-analysis begins in 
Scptembcr 1977with 
the auailubility o/ 
survey data on expec- 
tations of  the MI 
announcenrcnl.  Some 
may argue that 
the Fcdcral  Reserve 
began to opcrote 
more flcxibly under 
the nonborrowed 
reseruc procedure 
as early as July 1982. 
We chose October: 
because the decision 
wa: made to set aside 
the iW  target at 
thaOctober FOMC 
meeting. 
5. See  Ldmbra and 
Moron (1980) for a 
detailed description 
of the policy process 
under the fedeial  . 
funds rate proce- 
dure. Also, see  Wal- 
lich and Keir 71979) 
fir  a general discus- 
sion of  interest-rate 
smvothing under 
. the federal ju  nds 
operating procedu re. 
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Whether a given shock should or should 
lot be accommodated depends, in part, on the 
ong-run objectives of the Federal Reserve 
ind the nature of  the shock. If the Federal 
teserve is attempting to maintain a stable 
mce level, then real shocks, such as fluctua- 
ions in investment or government spending, 
hould be met by changes in the nominal inter- 
st rate. Financial shocks, such as fluctua- 
ions in money demand, should be absorbed 
,y changes in reserves.  . 
The most comnlpn of  these financia! shocks, 
he seasonal fluctuations in mone'y demand, 
,rise becauie of  the regular weekly, monthly, 
~nd  quarterly variations that arise from in- 
titutional details such as th;  average length 
~f the payment period in the labor mark&t, 
lifferences in cash management practices be- 
ween households and firms, tax payment  , 
lates. holidays, etc:The  seasonal'adjustment. 
~rocedure  may be thought of  as an attempt 
o supply reserves in a way that fully accom- 
nodates these transitory shocks to money ' 
lemand. However, the errors in the estimated 
easonal factors are  quite  large. Therefore,  one 
eason to have an elastic short-run reserve 
upply schedule is toaccommodate these hard- 
o-predict seasonal fluctuations in money 
lemand. 
The reason not to accommodate short-run 
,hocks  to the reserve market is to prevent 
~ccelerating  inflation from becoming embedded 
n the economy, as it did during the inflation- 
Iry period of  the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
:ederal  Reserve did maintain a flat short-run 
*eserve  supply curve., In principle, the Fed- 
!ral Reserve could make discretionary shifts 
n a very flat short-run reserve supply curve 
~nd  maintain long-run price stablity. In prac- 
ice, this procedure has led to a great deal 
)f  uncertainty about future inflation. 
In order to eliminate this uncertainty, cen- 
ral banks have adopted formal rules (such as 
nonetary growth targets, exchange rate pegs, 
I commodity standard, etc.) that instill con- 
'idence in their behavior over the long run. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
Given a long-run anchor for price stab~l~ty.  one 
:an  use the framework developed  by  Poole 
;1970) to show that an optimal short-run pro- 
zedure would partially accommodate shocks 
~f  unknown origin, allowing both the fed- 
eral funds rate and the quantity of  reserves 
to adjust. 
The period of  our analysis includes three 
different operating procedures. Each of  those 
procedures is described in detail below. We 
begin in 1977 with the federal funds proce- 
dure that was replaced h  Octo,&r  1979 by the 
nonborrowed reserve procedbre. This proce- 
dure was replaced by the borrowed reserve 
procedure in October 1982.1 
0 
The Federal Funds Rate procedure 
Following each regular meeting, the FOMC 
sent an ~perational  directive to the manager . 
of  the open market desk at the New YorRFed- 
era1 Reserve' ~ank'(hereafter  referred to as 
the trading  desk).  The  directive induded short- 
run paths for M1 and M2 and a narrow range 
for the federal funds rate. The  thrust of  the 
policy intention under this, or any other, pro- 
cedure can be described by the plannedgrowth 
path for the monetary aggregates. 
The FOMC used econometric and judgmen- 
tal models of  money demand to estimate the 
relationship between the monetary paths and 
the  level of  the  federal funds  rate. If  the FOMC 
had been mechanically trying to achieve the 
monetary paths,  it would have manipulated the 
federal funds rate target in response to new 
information about the money demand relation- 
ship. However, the FOMC did not mechanic- 
ally react in this way. While changes in the fed- 
eral funds target were made in the direction 
impliid by mechanical application of  the pro- 
cedure, the  changes were smaller than  required 
to effectively control monetary growth. The 
FOMC  showed a preference for smoothing 
changes in the federal funds rate? 
A typical directive for this period included 
a federal funds range 25 to 50 basis points 
wide. Growth within the range was usually 
conditioned on growth of  the monetary aggre- 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/6. Howeue~:  we might 
fipect  medium- and 
longterm interest 
yales  to rise if  the 
markel participants 
expect this increase 
in  to intensify 
inflation, or if  they 
expect the Federal 
Reserve to raise the 
;n/erest.rale  operat. 
ing range in future 
utceks. See Cornell 
(1983)  and Har- 
douvelis (1984) for 
an examination of 
the inBrmation con. 
tent of  money stock 
announcements in 
markets and 
for a survey oj  the 
literature. Gavin 
and Karamouzis 
(1984) exfend the 
evidence to include 
the experience under 
the borrowed reserve 
operating procedure 
and CRR. 
gates relative to two month paths that were 
chosen at the meetlng. The range In  the last 
week of  September 1977 was 6 percent to 
6.5 percent. The target was ra~sed  16 times 
in the next 2 years, usually in response tomon- 
etary growth above the short-run provisional 
paths.  The  average change was 33 basis points 
.so that the federal funds range was 11.25 per- 
cent to 11.75 percent in the last week before 
the change to the nonborrowed reserve oper- 
ating procedure. 
To comply with the directive, the trading 
desk would sell securities (thus draining re- 
serves) whenever the federal funds rate was 
expected to trade consistently below thc  lower 
limit and buy securities (thus  supplying re- 
serves) whenever the federal funds rate was 
expected to trade consistently above the upper 
limit. Market participants used the level of 
the federal.funds rate at the time of  trading 
desk market intervention to estimate the 
limits on the  operating range for the 'federal 
funds rate. 
While the narrow federal fundsjate  range 
was subject to a proviso about short-run 
growth in M1 and M2, changes' in the limits 
for the federal funds rate range were small 
(25 to 50 basis points) and infrequent (on aver- 
age less than  once a month). As a result of  this 
procedure, the market not only knew the cur- 
rent target, but also could forecast the federal 
funds rate several weeks in advance with rel- 
atively small errors. 
While market participants were well- 
informed about the location of  the reserve 
supply function, they had little information 
about aggregate reserve demand. Individual 
banks  could observe their  own reserve require- 
ments because requirements were calculated 
against deposits of  two weeks earlier. How- 
ever, market participants had little informa- 
tion with which to estimate aggregate reserve 
demand until the aggregate monetary data 
were released. Thus, while the weekly money 
stock announcement was important in pre- 
dicting aggregate reserve demand, it was use- 
ful in predicting the reserve supply function 
only in so far as  the federal funds rate limits 
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were expected to be changed in response to 
a deviation of  the money stock from the 
desired path. 
The reserve market under the federal funds 
rate operating procedure is shown in  panel a 
of figure 1. The reserve supply function Ri 
represents the end-of-period pos~tion  of  the 
reserve supply curve expected by  mzrket par- 
ticipants before the money stock announce- 
ment. The  reserve supply function is infinitely 
elastic, representing the expectation that the 
Federal Reserve would maintain the federal 
funds rate in the target range, thus accom- 
modatiqg all short-run changes in the de- 
mand for reserves. 
Likewise, R$ i-epresents the reserve de- 
mand'function expected by market partici- 
pants before the money stock announcement. 
~hg  reserve demand curve is inelastic with 
respect to the money stock and the federal 
4unds rate because of  LRR. The perceived fed- 
eral fuhds rate target before the announce- 
ment is illustrated in panel a of  figure  1 by a 
point estimate, FF*. This is the rate that is 
expected to prevail through the end of  the 
reserve maintenancegeriod. 
Suppose that a large unexpected increase 
in M1 was announced. The  expected end-of- 
period reserve demand curve would shift to 
the right. Because the public expected the 
Federal Reserve to accommodate unexpected 
shifts in the short-run demand for reserves, 
the cost of  obtaining reserves through the 
end of  the settlement period was expected to 
be  relatively unchanged. We  have portrayed 
the  short-run reserve  supply  curve  as  perfectly 
horizontal on the assumption that there *as 
no feedback to the change in M1  by the Fed- 
eral Reseive. If  there were a systematic revi- 
sion of the target between the a-nnouncement 
and the end of  the reserve settlement period, 
then the reserve supply function would have a 
positive slope. The  feedback prwedure used 
by the Federal Reserve to adjust the interest- 
rate target determined the  information content 
of the unexpected part of  the M1  announce- 
ment for the  contemporaneous reserve market.6 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/Z Wfricnd  (1.983) 
dt-t~elops  an aggre. 
gai; borrowirlg de 
mand function from 
a theory of  the bank- 
ingfirm. He shows 
that the expectcd 
spread between the 
fedcral  funds rate 
and discount rate is 
a non.linear/unction 
ojpast and expected 
future borrowing. 
Thisprovidesachan- 
nel for the expected 
future federal funds 
rate to influence the 
contemporaneous 
federal funds rate. 
8. See Stevens (1981) 
for a detailed descrip- 
tion of  policy during 
the first two years 
of the nonborrowed 
reserve targetingpro- 
cedure. See McCol- 
lum (1985) for fur- 
ther discussion of 
this point. 
The Norrborrowed Reserve Procedure 
When the FOMC announced a change in oper- 
ating procedure on October 6, 1979. there was 
a dramatic shange in the information flow 
:o the market about the relative position of 
:he reserve supply functions for the period 
3etween FOMC meetings. The Federal Reserve 
:onstructed  paths for reserves based on the 
short-run path for desired growth in the mon- 
:tary aggregates. This procedure was made 
~uite  complicated by lagged reserve require- 
ments. .Since the level of  required reserves  ' 
was based on past MI, the FOMC was essen- 
:ially forced to supply reserves to accommo-  ' 
iate past M1 growth. However, it could affect 
Future money growth by changing the price 
banks paid for reserves. 
At the planning stage, this is the  same analyt- 
~cal  framework used in policy decisions before 
3ctober 6,1979. However, there were impor- 
tant differences. First, there was a change 
in  the public discussion surrounding FOMC- 
iecisions. When the FOMC was choosing 
an explicit target for the federal funds rate, 
many observers attributed changes in the gen- 
tral level of  all market interest rates to Fed- 
2ral Reserve policy. While the Federal Reserve 
:ould  not control market interest rates, there 
may have been a perceived political constraint 
preventing large, discretionary changes in 
the federal funds rate target. 
Second, and perhaps more important, 
neither the FOMC,  nor anyone else, could 
predict the short-run changes in the interest 
rate that were necessary to achieve the Fed- 
2ral Reserve's monetary targets. By choosing 
a nonborrowed reserve target, the Federal 
Reserve allowed the market a greater hand in 
determining the level of  the  federal funds rate. 
In the planning stage, the decision about 
the expected federal funds rate was made 
implicitly by the FOMC  through the decision 
on  the mix of  nonborrowed versus borrowed 
reserves. Given the discount rate and total 
Federal Reserve Baqk of  Cleveland 
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reserve demand (based on past money growth). 
the federal funds rate was positively related 
to changes in  the ratio of  borrowed to total 
reserves. The initial level of  total reserves 
was calculated using the short-run monetary 
paths and estimates of the components of 
the money multiplier. 
Using its money demand framework, the 
Federal Reserve staff estimated a federal funds 
rate that was consistent with the monetary 
p&kcSuppose this rate was FFB shown in 
panel b of  figure 1. The FOMC also used econ- 
ometric and judgmental models to estimate 
the borrowingYunction. This is the upward- 
sloping portion of the reserve supply curve ( RS 
in  panel b). Because Federal Reserve admin- 
istrative guidelines discouraged banks from 
borrowing at the discount window, a greater 
spread between the federal funds rate and the 
discount 'rate was required to induce banks 
to borrow more at the discount window? 
In theory, the intersection of  the horizontal . 
line through FFB with the borrowing portion 
of  the reserve supply function suggested an 
appropriate initial borrowing assumption. 
The target for nonborrewed reserves (IVBR*) 
could be calculated by subtracting this borrow- 
ing assumption from expected total reserves. 
In practice, the FOMC often chose the most 
recent level of  borrowing as the initial bor- 
rowing assumpti~n.~ 
In summary, under the nonborrowed reserve 
procedure, targets for nonborrowed reserves 
were based on a short-run target path for Ml 
and an initial borrowing assumption. The 
procedure was to maintain that path for non- 
borrowed reserves and ,to allow unexpected 
changes in money and total reserve demand to 
spill over into the'discount window. The non- 
borrowed reserve path was adjusted by  the 
Federal Reserve staff in response to currently 
known, but previously unexpected, changes 
in the multiplier. There was a proviso during 
this period stated as a wide band for the fed- 
eral funds rate. Initially set to be four percen- 
tage points wide, it was at times as large as 
six percentage points. 
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Also, the FOMC sometimes chose to deGiate 
'rom  the short-run MI path for other policy 
-easons. This could be done by changing the 
liscount rate, which would lead to a vertical 
shift  in the borrowing function. It could also be 
lone by changing the nonborr~wed  reserve 
:arget which would lead to a horizontal shift ' 
n the reserve supply function. 
Market participants calculated the expected 
?on  borrowed reserve targets (NBR*  ) using. 
nformatioq about the annual monetary tar- 
gets, minutes from past FOMC meetings, and 
;he latest information about MI. An  unex- 
pectedly large change in the weekly money 
announcement induced a corresponding shift in 
the expected aggregate-reserve demand curve, 
causing market participants to revise their 
expectations about the cost of  federal funds. 
Market participants scrambled for 'reserves 
immediately after the announcement of  an '. 
unexpectedly large increase in the money 
stock, causing upward pressure on the fed- 
eral funds rate. In panel b of  figure 1, a sur- 
prise increase in the demand for reserves, 
from R:  to &f would cause the federal funds 
rate to rise from FFB to Ffi. 
An important aspect of  the nonborrowed 
reserve operating procedure was the automa- 
ticity in the response of  interest rates toa  devi- 
ation of  M1 from the short-run policy path. 
Under this procedure, deviations of  M2 and 
M3 were automatically accommodated by the 
weekly multiplier adjustments to the nonbor- 
rowed reserve path. For the  short run at  !east, 
M1 was clearly the primary target. 
In the  second half of  1982, the  FOMC  decided 
:hat it did not wish to automatically react to 
deviations of  M1 from the policy path, making 
the nonborrowed reserve procedure inappro- 
priate. This decision was based on the uncer- 
tainty surrounding financial innovations, 
=hanging  regulations, and the unusual behav- 
ior of  M1 velocity. 
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rhe Borrou;ed Reserve Procedure 
n October 1982, the ~0~c.set'aslde  the M1 
arget and the nonborrowed reserve procedure. 
The directive'to the trading desk called for a 
iegvee o/restraint in the provision of  reserves. 
~ften  phrased in relative terms, such as some- 
uhat less, thesame,  or somewhat more restraint. 
The FOMC made this directive operational 
for the trading desk by  translating the degree 
~f restraint into a target for borrowed reserves. 
The trading desk set nonborrowed reserve 
paths for one wqek at a time based on staff 
projections of  reserve demand and on the bor- 
rowed reserve target chosen by  the FOMC. 
On a day-to-day basis, therefore, nonborrowed 
reserves continued to be the instrument. 
Under LRR, the'Federa1 Reserve had good 
informatioh about reserve.demand. Each week 
(usually on°Friday) the trading desk adjusted 
the nonborrowed,reserve path to accom,mo- 
date the shift in reserve demand. The proce- 
dure is portrayed in panel c of  figure 1. The 
announcement of  an unexpectedly large 
increask in M1 and in reserve.demand was 
accompanied by a compensating dollar-for- 
dollar shift in the nonborrowed reserve path 
so that the borrowing target was maintained. 
On a weekly average basis, this procedure 
looked much like the federal funds operat- 
ing procedure in effect before October 1979. 
The nonborrowed reserve paths were adjusted 
each week to accommodate changes in reserve 
demand. Within the week, variations in the 
reserve market were along a given supply 
schedule. 
From one week to the next, 'the supply 
schedule was shated to match the expected . 
change in reserve demand and, thus, main- 
tain a given level for borrowed reserws. This 
borroweh reserve proqdure was similar to 
the federal funds procedure on an interweek 
basis, as  it led to expectations of  a horizontal 
supply curve for total reserves from one week 
to the next. 
One difference was that any shift in the 
borrowing demand curve  after October 1982 led 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/I to a different federal funds rate. Another dif-  I an upward shift in the borrowing demand 
ference was in  the daily owrating procedure. 
During the federal funds rate targeting 
period, the tradjng-desk  entered the market 
whenever the-federal funds rate deviated from 
the operating target.?~urin~  both the nonbor- 
rowed reserve and'the borrowed reserve pro- 
cedures, the Federal Reserve entered the mar- 
ket. if at all, only once a day, usually between 
11:30 a.m. and noon. The  operation was pri- 
marily defensive; that is.,  it was a response to 
offset movements in the uncontrollable sources 
of  reserve supply, such as  float, the Treasury. 
balance at the Fgderal Reserve, and other fac- 
tors. Also, the FQMC continued tdset a pro- 
viso in terms of  a wide band for the federal 
funds rate as it had done during the nonbor- 
rowed reserve procedure. 
Market participants did not know the exact 
amount of  the borrowing target. Neither they 
nor'the Federal Reserve knew the exact loca- 
tion of  the borrow'ing function. Consequently, 
market participants could not narrow down 
a small range for the federal funds rate  as they 
had done prior to October 1979. The weekly 
averages were very stable, but since the trigger 
for trading desk intervention was primarily 
reserve quantities rather than the  federal furids 
rate, the daily noise in the rate made it more 
difficult for the market to perceive changes in 
the stance of  policy than had been the case 
when the federal funds rate was the operating 
target. Nevertheless, on an interweekly basis, 
the borrowing target could be described as 
an  interest-rate smoothing procedure. 
Due to  lagged reserve accounting, the money 
stock announcement still contained informa- 
tion about the aggregate demand for reserves. 
However, under a borrowed reserve proce- 
dure, as under a federal funds procedure, the 
slope of  the expected reserve supply function 
depends on the feedback procedure used by 
the Federal Reserve to adjust the borrowed 
reserve target. In panel c of  figure 1, we have 
portrayed the  case where there is no feedback. 
However, in this case, expectations of  higher 
interest rates in coming weeks may cause 
I Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland 
- 
function, and the reserve supply would have 
a positive slope. 
Finally, the recent change to contemporaneous  - 
reserve settlement rules has important impli- 
cations for the effect of  money stock announce- 
ments or( the federal funds rate. Before Feb- 
ruary 2, 1984, the deviation of the money stock 
announcement from the expected level gave 
the market two types of information: the first 
was information about the aggregate quan- 
tity of  reserves that would be demanded be- 
tween the day of  the announcement and the 
next Wednesday; the second was information 
about the position of  the money stock relative 
to the perceived policy target. 
Under CRR, the money stock anngunce- 
ments no longer include new information about 
aggregate reserve demand. The reserve data 
.are released with a one day lag at the end 
of each two week reserve settlement period. 
The3M1  data are released with a 10 day lag. 
The reserve market will have cleai-ed before 
the money stock data for both weeks of  the 
reserve settlement period have been released. 
While the M1 announcement may contain 
new information about the level of  Mi relative 
to the perceived policy target, the market now 
has better information than it had before the 
change in rules. To some extent, the level 
of  Ml wlll be  inferred from the information 
in aggregate reserves. Before CRR, the  levels of 
deposits and required reserves against depos- 
its were reported in the same week. Under 
CRR, the reserve data are  available to be used 
in conjunction with multiplier projections to 
forecast MI.  Whether this would be a useful 
procedure depends on the  quality of  the multi- 
plier projections. 
Furthermore, banks have installed new 
information-gathering systems to meet reserve 
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requirements on a contemporaneous basis. In- 
dividual banks are learning more quickly 
about their own deposit levels, and they are 
pooling this information to make forecasts of 
MI. These factors  .suggest market expecta- 
tions of  IMI should have become more accurate 
after February 2. 1984. 
111. Empirical Results 
The  objective in this section is to summarize 
empirical findings about how the pattern of 
federal funds rate.response to unexpected 
' 
moneyastock  announcements has been influ- 
enced by the Federal Reserve's operaflng pro- 
cedures and reserve accounting rules. We also 
look at the quality of  the M1 forecasts. 
The Data 
~1'  is the figure first published by the Fed- 
eral Reserve in the H.6 fiess release. The  - 
expected change in M1 is calculated using the 
median of  a survey taken by Mon6y Market 
Services? The  expected chpg6s.  (MMSP)  are 
in billions of  dollars. The  expected change 
in M1 is calculated as: 
- log (MI!-1 1, 
where t refers to the week of  the announce- 
ment rather than the statement week for 
which M1 was calculated. The unexpected 
change in M1 is calculated as: 
The  actual change in M1 is calculated as: 
-. 
We have used first-published numbers rather 
than revised numbers in making these cal- 
culations. This amounts to treating the revi- 
sion as an unexpected change. Weeks that 
included'seasonal or benchmark revisions 
were omitted from the sample!0 
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We  used the M1 series that was published In 
the H.6 release. When the defin~tion  of  MI 
changed. our measure changed. Overlapping 
data were used to splice the series in early 
1980. when the Federal Reserve changed the 
definition of  h11 to include other checkable 
deposits. 
The  change in the federal funds rate (DFF) 
is calculated from the trade-weighted averages 
published in the H.15 release. Since the H.6 
release (moneyannouncement) was made avail- 
able to the public on various days of  the week 
throughout the sample period, we couected 
ddily data on the federal funds rate. A "before- 
announcement"  rate was taken as the last  . 
available value before the announcement. The 
"after-announcement" rate was taken as the 
first available value after the announcement. 
. DFE measured in basis points, is calculated 
as the difference between these rates. 
Figure 2 depicts the time series for DFE 
The  stochastic process generating the change 
.in the federal funds rate subsequent to the 
announcement of  a money stock surprise has 
apparently undergone change over this sam- 
ple period. Changes in the response of  the 
federal funds rate following money stock 
announcements are much larger during the 
nonborrowed reserve subperiod than in the 
rest of  the sample period. 
Casual inspection reveals another change 
between July and October of 1982. The  vari- 
ation in the series fell in the summer, but a 
systematic persistence qr regularity is not 
evident until after October 1982. Variation in 
DFF  has been reduced since the symmer of 
1982, but not to the low levels seen before 
October 1979. While the process generating 
DFF shows apparent change with changes in 
the operating procedures, there is  no appar- 
ent change in the process generating the inter- 
est rate series with the switch to CRR. 
The variance of  UM  (the median survey 
forecast error) was higher during the nonbor- 
rowed reserve operating procedure than it 
was during the other periods. There was also 
a tendency for the variance of  the forecast 
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error to fall. over time, after'october 1979. 
This can be seen in table l. which includes  . 
statistics measuring the accuracy of the M1 
forecast. 
We  have regressed the change in the Ioga; 
rithm of  first announced changes in M1 on  a 
constant and on the median survey forecast. 
The  constant was estimated to be different 
from zero in the period of federal funds rate 
targeting and in the last period under CRR. 
The  coefficient  on the  expected change was not 
significantly different from 1, except in the 
last period. Theexplanatory power of  the equa- 
tion was lowest during the perlod of  nonbor- 
rowed reserve targeting. It rose from 51 per- 
cent under the borrowed reser.. es targeting 
procedure and LRR  to 75 percent with the 
switch to CRR. 
Many authors have presented evidence on 
the rationality of  the median of  the survey 
forecast?'  In general, they find that the 
median survey forecast is unbiased ahd'effi- 
cient, except duringJthe early part of  the 
nonborrowed reserve operating procedure.' . 
.  . 
? 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/Hafer (1983) finds that median survey fore- 
cast errors are correlated with past informa- 
tlon during this period. He attributes this 
apparent inefficiency to a learning process 
associated with the new procedure.  - 
We  have also found that the median sur- 
vey foretast errors are correlated with past 
interest rates and actual M1 changes during 
this period. In a regression of  C'M on past 
announced changes in ME  and past weekly 
changes in the federal funds rate, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that 13-week lags in both 
variables help significantly in predicting UM. 
Webb (1984) points out that these in-sample 
tests are inadequate tests of  rationality. As 
Webb predicts, we find that using the esti- 
mated systematic variation from the first half 
of  the nonborroaed reserve'period does not 
' 
help predict M1 in'the second half of the period. 
These results are available upon request 
fr'om the authors. 
We  find a more serious problem with thes 
forecast in the last period. While the forecast 
is unbiased in the first three subperiods, we 
cannot reject'the hypothesis that it has been 
badly biased since the introduction of  CRR 
(see table 1). Once again, the market may be 
going through a learning period. We saw above 
that the standard error of  the forecast fell 
with the introduction of  CRR. In table 1, we 
see that the explanatory power of the equa- 
tion is highest in the last period even though 
the forecast is biased. There are two cases 
in which this estimated bias would not be a 
sign of  irrationality. 
The  first is the case in which past estimated 
bias does not help predict M1 in the future. 
We followed the procedure suggested by Webb 
(1984) to colistruct a morc powerful test of 
the rationality of  the survey forecast in this  - 
period. We estimated the equation shown 
in table 2 over the first 31 weeks of  CRR 
(deleting the February 16, 1984, observation 
due to seasonal and benchmark revisions) and 
used the estimated equation, AMt = -0.113 
+ 1.36 EMt to forecast the remaining 16 weeks 
of  the sample perid. ?he  root mean squared 
errgr (RMSE) of  the adjusted forecast was 
22 percent lower than the  RMSE of the medias 
survey forecast, su'ggesting that the median 
- 
Table 1  Accuracy of  the Median Survey Forecast 
AMf =  co  + clEMf  + el 
Sample period  CO  CI  SEE  R2  DW 
9/29/77 to 10/4/79  -0.13  1.16  0.42  0.49  1.81 
(103 observations)  (-2.64)  (9.91) 
10/11/79 to 10/1/82  0.05  1.14  0.54  0.30  1.85 
(150 observations)  (1.06)  (8.12) 
10/8/82 to 1/27/84  0.05  :-&*  0  0.51  2.23 
(68 6bsqvations)  (1.04)  (8.44)  . 
2/3/84  to 12/20/84  -0.14  1.48  0.28  0.75  2.30 
(46 observations)  '  (-3.07)  (1  1.69) 
NOTE:  The expeaed change in M1 is calculated as: 
EM,  = l~g(Ml~-~  + MMSP,) - l~g(Ml,-~), 
where lZfMSP is the median survey forecast of the M1  change. and t refers to the week of  the announcement rather than thestatement week for 
wh~ch  M1 was calculated. The actual change in MI is calculated as: 
AM, = l~g(dfl,))  - l~g(Ml,-~). 
SEE 1s the standard error of  the regression.K2 is thecoefficient  of  determinationadjusted for degrees of  freedomnand  DW  is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. We have excluded observations  in whichthe announced level of  M1 included an expected benchmark or seasonal factor revision. The 
t-statistics are shown in  parentheses. 
-.  .  -  . 
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M1 more acc'uratel  y does not help predict 
changes in asht  prices more accurately. In 
this cask [he market may have little incentive 
to correct the systematic bias in predictions 
of  Ml.'" 
The ;'Clodel 
The  empirical model used to examine the 
behavior of  the federal funds rate following  . 
a money stock announcement is based on the 
efficient market hypothesis, which Pmplies 
that the current asset price will reflect all 
publicly available information. Therefore, sub- 
sequent changes in the asset price,shou,ld  . 
reflect only new information coming into the 
market. The  empirical model takes the fol- 
lowing form: 
DFF;  =  change in the federal funds rate. 
'  from before the announcement 
to after.  the announcement. 
. I;'l\ft  7  unexpected change in the money 
stock announcement at time I. 
E:21,  =  expected change in,the  money 
stock at time t, and 
e  =  error term.. 
Under the efficient market' hypothesis, if 
expectations are rational, then a.  and a* will 
be zero, and the error term will be random. 
If  the money stock is an important factor in 
determining the federal funds rate, a, will 
be significant. In ,other words, under thg effi- 
cie~t  market hypothesis, only the unantic- 
ipated component of  the M1 announcement 
should influence DFF because the federal 
funds rate level before the announcement 
should already reflect all relevant publicly 
available information. 
The sample period, September 15,1977, to . 
I 
Table 2  &act  of Money Stock ~nnouncernenis  on the Federal FUA~;  Rate 
Contemporaneous 
Lagged reserve accounting  reserve accounting 
Federal  Nonborrowed  Borrowed ,  Borrowed 
funds  reserve  reserve  reserve 
targeting  targeting  targeting  targeting 
Estimation period 
Constant  0.009  0.064  0.047  -0.070 
. -  (0.79)  (1.17)  (1.77)  (-1.14) 
I 
Surprise in Ml 
Expected change in M1  -0.023  -0.16.1  -0.035  -0.337 
(-0.89)  (-0.94)  (-0.49)  (-2.76)  I 
I  Autocorrelation coefficient  -  I,  -  0.342  I 
I  Standard error of the regression  0.092  0.651  0.203  0.265  I  I  Durbin-Watson  1.891  2.235  1.733  2.040  I 
I  NOTE: The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  1 
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December 20. 1984, is divided into the four 
subperiods'that correspond to different oper- 
ating procedures or different reserve account- 
ing regimes. The first subperiod began with. 
the availability of  surveydata about expected, 
changes in M1  and  covers t hepre-October 1979 
period of  federal funds rate targeting. In  this 
period, we do not expect the federal funds rate 
to respond to unexpected changes in  MI. 
The  second subperiod covcr,s the  October 11. 
1979, to October 1, 1982, period of  nopbor- 
rowed reserve targeting and .iagged  reserve 
accounting. In this period, we expect a strong 
positive correlation between unexpected 
changes in M1 and subsequer;t  changes in 
the federal fund3 rate. 
The third subperiod covers the October 8, 
1982, to january 27,  1984, period of  borrowed 
reserve targeting and lagged reserie account- 
ing. Since the trading desk is expected to fully 
accommodate unexpected shifts in-reserve 
demand. we do not expect the federal funds 
rate to respond to unexpected changes in M1 
under the borrowed reserve targeting pro- 
cedure. 
The last subperiod, February 3, 1984, 
to December 20, 1984, is a period of  borrowed 
reserve targeting and contemporaneous re- 
serve accounting. Since a borrowed reserve 
operating procedure is in effect, estimates of 
a1  are  expected to be insignificant unless 
there is a systematic shift in the borrowing 
demand function following a money stock 
announcement. 
Reaction to Surprises in M1 
The results from estimating equation 3 for 
four  different subperiods are reported in 
table 2. The  coefficient of  the unexpected 
change in the MI,  a,,  is positive in all cases, 
but statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level only in the nonborrowed reserve target- 
ing period. A 1 percent surprise in the money 
stock in that period resulted in a 40-basis- 
point increase in the federal funds rate. No 
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statistically significant relationship was'un- 
covered in  the other three subperiods. These  - 
empirical results are consistent with the ' 
. 
simple illustrations of  the reserve market .  . 
shown in figure I. They indicarethat the 
money stock announcement was not a signif- 
icant factor in. the curr<nt reserve market 
except during the period of  nonborrowed re- 
serve targeting. 
Tests for Structu~al  Challge 
We  have assumed that either a change in the 
operating procedure or in the reserve account- 
ing rules would cause a change in our esti- 
mates  of thecoefficients in the efficient mar- 
ket model. We calculated the Wald Statistic 
to test whether or not the-estimated coeffi- 
cients are equal for any two adjacent subperi- 
ods (see table 3). The hypothesis that the'esti- 
mated coefficient vectors are equal is rejected 
at a 1 percent level.of significance when the 
estimates from the federal iunds targeting 
period are  compared to the  estimates from the 
nonborrowed reserve targeting period. The  - 
same hypothesis is also rejected at the 1 per- 
cent level of  significance when estimates from 
the borrowed reserve targeting period under 
lagged reserve requirements are compared to 
estimates from the borrowed reserve tar- 
geting period under contemporaneous reserve 
requirements. However. we can only weakly 
reject (at a 10 percent level) the hypothesis 
thzt the vector of  coefficients from the non- 
borrowed reserve period is equal to the vector 
of  coefficients estimated.for the period of  bor- 
rowed reserve targeting. 
0 
The  hypothesis that the estimated a1  coeffi- 
cients are equal is rejected at a 1 percent level 
of  significance when the estimate from the 
federal funds targeting period as compared to 
the estimate from the nonborrowed reserve 
targeting period. This hypothesis is also re- 
jected at  a 1 percent level of significance when 
the estimate from the nonborrowed reserve 
targeting period is compared to the estimate 
from the borrowed reserve targeting period. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/I. 
The.same h.ypot)e,sis cannot be rejected when 
the borrowed reserve'targeting period under 
lagged reserve requirements is compared to 
borrowed reserve targeting period under con- 
temporaneous reserve requirements. While 
the
coverall model changed with .the introduc- 
tion of  CRR, there was no si'gnificant reaction 
to b11  in either period. 
I The Ef/icierrt Market Hypothesis 
Table 3  Large Sample Tests 
for Structural Change 
Wald Statistic for the 
null hypothesis 
Vector a 
equal  a, equal 
across  across  - 
D  perkah  -periods 
Periods compared  X&  ~$1  - 
Federal funds 
targeting vs. 
Non'oorrowed  reserve 
16.25'  14.57" 
targeting 
, 
- --  - 
Non borrowed reserve 
In no case is the constant term statistically 
significant.  In addition, theestimatesof  a2,  the 
coefficient of  the expected changes in MI,  are 
not statistically different from zero in the .first 
targeting vs. 
Borrowed reserve 
targeting  (LRR) 
Borrowed reserve 
targeting  (LRR)  vs. 
Borrowed reserve 
12.10'  0.61 
targeting  (CRR) 
FJOTE: These tests are based on the Wald Statistic ( W): 
W  = (81  - ~ZS[O~CX~XI)-~  + o$(x~x~)-~I(BI  - 82). 
where 8, is the vector of  regressioncoefficients  and U:(X;X,)-'  is the 
vanance.covariance matrix of  thecafficients in the ith perid. Unlike 
the Chow F test. this test does not rquire  qua1  sample size or qua1 
covariance matrixes across regimes. Watt (1979) presents Monte Carlo 
evidence toshow that. in thepresenceof heteroskedasticity,  this test is 
at least as powerfulas theJayatism  (1977)modificationof  thechow test 
when the samplesize isas largeas50. See Silvey  (1975. pp. 115-116) for 
a description of  the Wald Statistic. 
a. Reject the hypothesis that the estimatedcoefficients are the same 
for the two sample periods with a critical region of  1 percent. 
b.  Reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are ehe same 
for the tyo  sample periods with a critical region of  10 percent. 
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three subperiods. However, in the last sub- 
period of ccntemporaneous reserve account- 
ing,.  the coefficient has a negative sign and 
the null hy.pothesis is not rejected at the 5 per- 
cent' lerel; This finding, in conjunction with 
the presence of  serial correlation in the resid- 
uals, raises concern about the efficienty of  - 
the market andloi the rationality of  the fore- 
cast. We  saw above that the median survey 
forecast was biased in this last period. 
Rbley (1983) finds a similar problem in the  - 
Treasu-ry  bill market during the period of  non- 
borrowed reserve targeting. He con.structed 
a revised expectation series by allowing for 
bias in the forecast, and by modifying the . 
median of  the Tuesday survey to include the 
new information (the  change in the interest 
rate) from the time of  the  Survey to just before 
the money announcement. Uslng.this revised 
forecast, Roley finds that the estimated coef- 
ficient of  the reyised expected cha'nge in M1 is 
not statistically different from zero. 
Hein (1985) shows that if  one does not cor- 
rect for bias in the  forecast, then the  estimated 
coeffjcient of  the revised expected change in 
M1 in Roley's model isagain significant at the 
5 percent level. We  have found similar results 
for the federal funds rate under CRR. How- 
ever, even when we  constructed a revised fore- 
cast as in Roley, we could not eliminate the 
significance of  a2  or the serial correlation in 
the residual of  the DFF  equation. 
IV. Conclusions 
The  role and formation of  expectations have 
received considerable attention in the  last 
decade. Studies have emphasized the impor- 
tance of  the market's perception of  and reac- 
tion to new information about economic policy. 
This  article examines the  effect that monetary 
control arrangements have on the informa- 
tion content of  the money stock announce- 
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ments in the market for reserves. Specifically, 
we show that there was very little informa: 
tlon in the announcement for the reserve 
market except during the period when the 
Federal Reserve used a nonborrowed reserve 
operating procedure, We  show that the pres- 
ent operating procedure may be characterized 
as an interest-rate smoothing procedure. 
Since the introduction of contemporaneous 
rescrv-e requirements, we show that, while 
the error in the M1 forecast has been reduced, 
the forecast has been biased and the stochastic 
process generating the federal funds rate has 
not been consistent with statistical assump- 
tions of  the efficient markqt model. While we 
have rejected the statistical implications of 
the efficient market model for this short  . 
Sample period, we have not. rejected the eco- 
nomic implications; that is, we have not Shown 
that one could profit by using our model to 
trade in the reserve market.  o 
Appendix:  Contemporaneous 
Reserve Requirements and 
the Timing of the Weekly 
M1  Announcement  . 
Between September 1968 and February 1984, 
banks were required to hold reserves against 
deposits on a lagged basis; that is, average 
daily reserves held in any given week were 
used to meet reserve requirements calculated 
from deposit levels of  two weeks earlier. This 
lag was instituted in 1968 to give individual 
banks precise knowledge about the level of  . 
their reserve requirements. The  lag also gave 
the Federal Reserve time to collect informa- . 
tion about aggregate reserve demand. 
In February 1984, the Federal Reserve 
implemented a return to almost contempo- 
raneous reserve requirements (CRR)? The 
banking system had objected to this switch 
on the grounds that it would be costly to set 
up the information systems necessary to 
monitor deposit levels on an instantaneous 
basis. As a concession to this issue, the Fed- 
eral Reserve chose a form of  CRR that was 
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not truly contemporaneous. Instead, the lag 
was reduced from 14 days to 2 days. 
The new rules included other changes. 
One change is a lengthening of  the reserve 
accounting period from one week to two weeks. 
Banks now post reserves, averaged over two 
weeks ending on a Wednesday, against depos: 
its averaged over two weeks ending on a 
Monday, gjving them two days to collect data 
on transactions deposits and to adjust their 
reserve positions accordingly. 
Another change is that the lag on reserve 
requirements against other reservable depos- 
its (nonpersonal time depo3its and Eurocur- 
rency liabilities) has increased from 14 days 
to 30 days. For example, reserve requirements 
held in a two week period ending Wednesday, 
March 13, 1985, were held against transaction 
deposits held in the two week period ending 
Monday, March 11, and against other reserv- 
able deposits held in the two week period end- 
ing Monday, February 11. Vault cash eligible 
to be counted as reserves in the period Feb- 
ruary 28 to March 13 was equal to vault cash  . 
held during tge period January 29 to Febm- 
ary 11-also a 30-day Gfference. 
Under lagged resetve requirement rules 
(LRR), banks had been permitted to carry 
forward any excess or deficiency up to 2 per- 
cent of  their required reserves. Any carry- 
over not offset during the next period could 
not be carried forward into additional peri- 
ods.  There was  a temporary change under the 
qew  rules. The new rules stated that the per- 
centage of  required reserves that an institu- 
tion may carry forward would be 3 percent 
until August 1, 1984, and 2.5 percent until 
January 30, 1985. Thereafter, the percentage 
would be 2 percent or $25,000, whichever was 
greater. Since the  2 percent is based on reserves 
cumulated, not daily averages, the absolute 
amount  of carryover is now double the  amount 
allowed under LRR, because the reserve settle- 
ment period has been increased to two weeks. 
There was also a change in the timing of 
the weekly money stock announcement. The 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/announcement was moved up one day to 
Thursday, 4:30 Eastern standard time. Even 
though the Federal Reserve required banks 
to speed up the collection and reporting of 
deposit data, the actual data released on 
Thursday are slightly "older" than data that 
had been released on Friday. Under the LRR 
regime, the weekly money stock data released 
on Friday referred to the average qily  level 
of  M1 for the week ending on Wednesday, 
nine days earlier. Under the new arrange- 
ment, the data released on Thursday refer to 
the average dailplevel of  M1 for the week 
ending Monday, 10 days earlier. 
On the last day (Wednesday)  of  the reserve 
maintenance period, all banks have to meet 
their reserve requirements. This  is an unusual 
market; we can think of  no other where all 
firm  areaequired to adjust inventories' to 
spe'cified levels at the same time. During the 
reserve accounting period, before the mbney 
--  - 
stock announcement, each bank can rnontror 
its own depos~ts  to estimate its ~ndlv~dual 
reserve requirement, but ~t has no ~nforma- 
tlon about aggregate reserve demand. Ilnder 
lagged reserve accounting rules, the  announce- 
ment of  MI was made nine days after the end 
of  the deposit computation period, but five 
days before  the end of  the reserve mainte- 
enance period. Consequently, the money stock 
announcement contained information about 
the aggregate demand for reserves in the  settle- 
ment period that would end five days hence 
(see figure 3, panel a). Under CRR, the weekly 
announcements on Thursday.apply to only 
half of  a deposit computation period. The an- 
nouncement of  M1 for the first half of  the 
deposit computation period is  made one day 
after the reserve market clears. The  announce- 
men t of  M1 for the second half of  the deposit 
computation period is made eight days after 
the reserve market clears (see figure 3, panel b). 
Fig. 3  The Timing of  Reserve Requirements 
and M1  Announcements  . 
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